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THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE IN MONTANA
The doctrine of last clear chance was first announced by an English
court in Davies v. Mann.' It provides that a plaintiff may recover
for personal or property damages regardless of his own negligence if
the defendant negligently fails to exercise the last clear opportunity to
avoid the accident. Last clear chance is the most commonly recognized
exception to the defense of contributory negligence, which operates as
a complete bar to any action of negligence.2 Since last clear chance
is a basis for an affirmative claim for relief, the plaintiff must sustain
the burden of proof.3
Generally, contributory negligence bars any recovery in a neg-
gence action. Several explanations have been given for the doc-
trine of last clear chance as an exception to this rule.4  One
explanation is that the later negligence of the defendant involves
a higher degree of fault. However, it does not take into account cases
in which the defendant negligently fails to discover the situation, is
slow to react, or makes an error in judgment. Support for this explana-
tion is found in cases where the defendant discovers the situation, and
his conduct approaches intentional or reckless disregard of the plaintiff's
rights. However, if the conduct-commonly characterized as "willful,"
"wanton," or "reckless"-approaches intent, the ordinary contributory
negligence of the plaintiff will not bar recovery, and there will be no
need to rely upon the doctrine of last clear chance. If the defendant's
negligence is "gross," but not willful or wanton, the plaintiff's ordinary
contributory negligence is usually a defense. 6 Possibly, much con-
fusion could result in determining when conduct is sufficiently willful
M. & W. 546, 152 ENO. REP. 588 (1842). The plaintiff had left his donkey fetered
on the highway. The defendant, with a team of horses pulling a wagon, came down
a slight descent "at a smartish pace," ran into the donkey, knocked it down, and
killed it. The defendant was held liable for the consequences of his later negligence.
See JAMES, Last Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine, 47 YALE L. J. 704 (1938),
and MACINTYR, The Rationale of Last Clear Chance, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1225 (1940).
'RESTATEMENT, (SECOND) Or TORTS Section 463 (1965). Contributory negligence is
conduct on the part of the plaintiff which falls below the standard to which he
should conform for his own protection, and which is a legally contributing cause
co-operating with the negligence of the defendant in bringing about the plaintiff's
harm. Section 467 provides: Except where the defendant has the last clear chance,
the plaintiff's contributory negligence bars recovery against a defendant whose
negligent conduct would othwise make him liable to the plaintiff for the harm
sustained by him.
Id. at Section 281 sets forth the four elements of a claim for relief for negligence.
Summarized briefly, these elements are: duty, negligence, cause, damage. In Section
328(a), the plaintiff has the burden of proving these four elements.
'Id. at Section 479, Comment (a). See PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW Or TORTS,
437-438 (3d ed. 1964).
5PRossER, supra note 4, at 436 concludes that all courts hold that the plaintiff's
ordinary negligence will not bar recovery. The basis for his conclusion is that "such
conduct differs from negligence not only in degree but in kind, and in the social
condemnation attached to it."
6id. at 436. Gross negligence is defined as an extreme departure from ordinary
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so that contributory negligence is not a bar to recovery. To avoid the
confusion, a plaintiff might prefer to rely upon the doctrine of last clear
chance.
The most common explanation is that the plaintiff's negligence is
not a "proximate" or "legal" cause of the injury. The later negligence of
the defendant is a "superseding" cause which relieves the plaintiff of
responsibility for his contributory negligence.7 Although this theory
may fix liability upon the last human wrongdoer, it does not conform
to ideas of proximate cause. For instance, if a plaintiff's negligence
places himself or his property in a position of peril, such negligence is a
proximate cause of his own injury. Therefore, the injury from the
defendant's negligence is certainly within the risk which the plaintiff
has created Furthermore, in an tutomobile collision, a negligent plaintiff
is liable to an injured passenger in the defendant's car even though the
defendant has the last clear chance to avoid striking the plaintiff.
The plaintiff's negligence is clearly a responsible cause of injuries to
the passenger.8  The real explanation apparently arises out of a
dislike for the defense of contributory negligence. Courts reject the
defense in cases where they can conclude that the defendant's negli-
gence was the "worst," "final," or "decisive" factor in producing the
injury.9
Under last clear chance, there are two distinguishable clas-
sifications: I. THE HELPLESS PLAINTIFF, and II. THE INATTENTIVE PLAIN-
TIFF. These classifications have been further subdivided into four cate-
gories for purposes of determining recovery in the United States.'0
This scheme of recovery may be set out as follows:
I. HELPLESS PLAINTIFF-ACTUAL DiscovERY By DEFENDANT. The
helpless plaintiff, by his prior negligence, has placed himself in a
position from which he is powerless to extricate by the exercise of
ordinary care; and the defendant discovers the plaintiff's position
of peril in time to avoid injuring him, fails to exercise reasonable
care to do so.
e.g. A plaintiff negligently drives onto a railroad crossing without
looking for approaching trains, and his truck stalls on the tracks.
7In Mihelich v. Butte Electric Ry., 85 Mont. 604, 281 P.540 (1929), proximate cause
is defined as "that cause, which in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any new independent cause, produces the injury, and without which it would not
have occurred." The terms "proximate cause" and "legal cause" are often used
interchangeably. Legal cause is defined in RESTATEMENT, supra, note 2 at Section
"431: "The actor's conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if (a) his conduct
is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and (b) there is no rule of law
relieving the actor from liability because of the manner in which his negligence has
resulted in the harm.''
'RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, at Section 479, Comment (c).
'Id. see PRossER, supra note 4, at 438.
IOREsTATFMENT, supra note 2, at Sections 479 and 480. The helpless plaintiff is
defined in Section 479. The inattentive plaintiff is defined in Section 480.
[Vol. 30
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Finding his door jammed, he becomes stuck in the window in an at-
tempt to crawl to safety as the defendant's train approaches. The
defendant's engineer sees and realizes the plaintiff is in a helpless
position of peril in time to avoid injuring him, but fails to uses
reasonable cars to avoid the injury. The defendant is liable to the
plaintiff for personal and property damages.
All courts recognizing the doctrine permit recovery under this Cate-
gory.
11
II. HELPLESS PLAINTIFF-DEFENDANT DOES NOT DISCOVER. The
helpless plaintiff, by his prior negligence has placed himself in a
position from which he is powerless to extricate by the exercise
of ordinary care; and the defendant does not discover, but is under
a duty to exercise ordinary care to discover and realize the plain-
tiff's position of peril, and to avoid injuring him.
e.g. The same plaintiff as above negligently places himself in an
inextricable position of peril. The defendant's engineer, in the exer-
cise of proper care, could easily discover the plaintiff's presence
on the crossing. However, the engineer fails to discover the plain-
tiff, therefore causing the injuries. The defendant is liable for
personal and property damages.
Although there is a split in authority, recovery is permitted by a
majority of courts.12
III. INATTENTIVE PLAINTIFF-ACTUAL DISCOVERY By DEFENDANT.
The inattentive plaintiff negligently fails to pay attention to his
surroundings, thus placing himself in a position of peril to which
he is oblivious, but from which he could escape by the exercise of
reasonable care; and the defendant knows of or discovers the plaint-
tiff's situation, and realizes or has reason to realize that the plain-
tiff is inattentive and therefore unlikely to discover his peril in
time to avoid the harm, and thereafter is negligent in failing to
utilize with reasonable care and competence his then existing op-
portunity to avoid the 'harm.
e.g. A plaintiff walks across a street between intersections, negli-
gently failing to pay attention to approaching traffic. The defend-
ant, in an approaching automobile, sees the plaintiff and realizes
that is inattentive, but negligently fails to avoid striking him. The
defendant is liable for personal and property damages.
There is a split of authority, but recovery is permitted by a ma-
jority of cdurts.'5
e.g.. The same plaintiff as above negligently crosses the street
without paying attention to approaching traffic. The defendant
also fails to pay attention to his 'surroundings as he drives along
the street. He does not discover, but in the exercise of reasonable
care, could have discovered the plaintiff; and' therefore fails to
avoid injuring him. The defendant is liable for peisonal and property
damages.
U2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS, 1246, Section-22.13 (1956), and PROSSER,
supra note 4, at 439. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, at Section 479- (a) (b) (i).
112 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 11, at. 1246, PROssER, supra note 11, at 440, and
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There is a split of authority, but recovery is permitted by a majority
of courts.' 3
IV. INATTENTIVE PLAINTIFF--INATTENTivE DEFENDANT. The inat-
tentive plaintiff negligently fails to pay attention to his surround-
ings, thus placing hemself in a position of peril to which he is
oblivious, but from which he could escape by the exercise of rea-
sonable care; and the defendant does not discover, but would have
discovered and realized the plaintiff's position of peril in time
to avoid injuries had he exercised the reasonable care he owed
to the plaintiff.
e.g. The same plaintiff as above negligently crosses the street
without paying attention to approaching traffic. The defendant also
fails to pay attention to his surroundings as he drivers along the
street. He does not discover, but in the exercise of reasonable care,
could have discovered the plaintiff; and therefore fails to avoid
injuring him. The defendant is liable for personal and property
damages.
Only one jurisdiction is recognized as clearly allowing recovery
under this category.' 4
An additional situation may arise in which the defendant, after
discovering either a helpless or an inattentive plaintiff's position of
peril, does all within his power to avoid the injury; however, his own
antecedent negligence, such as faulty equipment, prevents him from
avoiding the injuries. Most courts deny recovery on the theory that
there is no logical reason for distinguishing between the prior negli-
gence of the defendant and that of the plaintiff who put himself into
a position of peril.15
The case which established the doctrine of last clear chance in
Montana was Neary v. No. Pac. Ry. C0.16 In Neary, the deceased was
standing between the rails of the track with his back toward the defend-
ant's approaching train. He was oblivious to his perilous position and
was struck and killed by the defendant's train. The court stated:
"2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 11, at 1246, PROSSER, supra note 11 at 441, and
RESTATEMENT, supra note 11 at Section 480 (a)(b)(c). The RESTATEMENT limits
recovery to this category.
"4RESTATMENT, supra note 2. Recovery is not recognized under this category in the
RESTATEMENT. HARPER & JAMES, supra note 11, at 1246, and PROSSER, supra note
11, at 441 conclude that only Missouri allows recovery under this category. Missouri,
under its ''humanitarian doctrine" allows recovery under all four categories. In
Krause v. Pitcairn, 350 Mo.339, 167 S.W.2d 74, 78 (1942), the court said: "Our
humanitarian doctrine is reasoned upon precepts of humanity . . . and is not now
sought to be justified on theories involving proximate cause, comparative negligence,
wilfulness, recklessness or wantonness." See 7 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 161 (1935). For
a collection of cases, see 171 A.L.R. 365, 413 (1947). BoREz, in 18 MONT. L. REv.
231, 232 (1957) concludes that at least four other jurisdictions have applied the
doctrine under this category.
5PRossER, supra note 4, at 442-443.
1837 Mont. 461, 97 P.944 (1908). See TOELLE, 5 MONT. L. RaV. 12, 15. TOELLE con-
cludes that the first Montana case to suggest the doctrine is Riley v. N.R.Ry., 36
Mont. 545, 93 P.948 (1908).
[Vol. 30
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NOTES
The obligation of the defendant arises only when the plaintiff is
seen to be in a perilous situation. When defendant becomes both
aware of his presence and his peril, plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence is eliminated from the case. 2 Thompson On Negligence, Sec-
tion 1735.17
The proposition that "plaintiff's contributory negligence is eliminated
from the case" is questionable since a plaintiff concedes his own negli-
gence when relying upon the doctrine of last clear chance. Possibly,
the court meant that contributory negligence is "eliminated" from
the case insofar as it does not operate to bar recovery under the
doctrine. Although the court seemingly recognized the requirement
of actual discovery by using the language, "seen . . . and becomes
aware," it went on to say:
The general rule that one's own negligence . . . precludes recovery is
subject to the qualification that, where the defendant has discovered,
or should have discovered, the peril of the plaintiff's or deceased's
position, and it is apparent that he cannot escape therefrom or for
any reason does not make an effort to do so, the duty becomes
imperative for the defendant to use all reasonable care to avoid the
injury . . . notwithstanding the negligence of the injured party. 18
The court did not distinguish between helpless and inattentive plain-
tiffs. However, the words, "he cannot escape" (helpless plaintiff), "or
for any reason does not make an effort to do so" (inattentive plaintiff),
refer to both.
In Nearj, the deceased was an inattentive plaintiff because he
was oblivious to his perilous position. The court found that the de-
fendant's engineer saw the deceased and was therefore guilty of "gross"
negligence. Possibly, the use of the word, "gross," indicates a con-
clusion by the court that the defendant's negligence involved a higher
degree of fault.19 However, this theory could have been avoided be-
cause the defendant's negligence was later in time, giving the defend-
ant the last opportunity to avoid the injury. The Neary case was re-
solved under 11. INATTENTIVE PLAINTIFF-ACTUAL DISCOVERY By DE-
FENDANT, because the defendant's engineer saw the inattentive plaintiff.
However, the words, "or should have discovered," in the quoted lan-
gauge above, would suggest recovery under IV. INATTENTIVE PLAINTIFF-
INATTENTIVE DEFENDANT."0
137 Mont. 461, 464, 97 P.944, 947 (1908).
"Id. at 464.
"Grossnegligence on the part of the defendant's engineer was failing to stop in time
after actually discovering the plaintiff's position of peril. Such conduct did niot
approach willfulness or wantonness, so the plaintiff's ordinary negligence would
have been a bar to an action against the gross negligence of the defendant's engineer.
'Four years after Neary, two cases were decided together, Melzner v. N.P.Ry., 46
Mont. 162, 127 P.146 (1912), and Itaddox v. N.P.Ry., 46 Mont. 185, 127 P.152
(1912). The court approved a requested instruction that the duty of the engineer
to make all reasonable efforts to avoid striking the intestate, who was unobservant of
the defendant's approaching engine, did not arise until the engineer actually dis-
covered the intestate in a position of peril. The cases were therefore resolved under
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The court sought to clarify last clear chance in Dahmer v. No. Pac.
Ry. Co. 21 In Dahmer, the plaintiff, while awaiting the arrival of a
train late at night, was struck unexpectedly on the head, causing him
to stagger and fall partially stunned upon the rails. His foot was
caught by a wire on the tracks, and the defendant's "through-train"
severed both feet. At the trial level, the plaintiff recovered for personal
injuries on the basis of last clear chance. On appeal, the Supreme
Court stated three elements essential to recovery under this doctrine:
(1) The exposed condition brought about by the negligence of theplaintiff or the person injured; (2) The actual discovery by thedefendant of the perilous situation of the person or property in time
to avert injury; (3) The failure of defendant thereafter to use or-dinary care to avert the injury.22
The court granted a new trial holding that evidence was insufficient
to justify the jury's conclusion that the defendant's engineer discovered
the position of peril in time to avoid the injury. In dicta, the court
said that the words, "or should have discovered," used in the Neary
case were unfortunate, and actual discovery of the position of peril
henceforth would be required.23
The actual discovery requirement established by the Dahmer case was
qualified in Doichinoff v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. 4 In Doichin-
off, the deceased was apparently unaware of the defendant's approach-
ing train as he walked upon the railroad track. Although the defend-
ant's engineer had an unobstructed view of him, the deceased was run
over and killed. The court sustained the trial court's refusal of in-
structions on contributory negligence. The court held that the theory
of last clear chance necessarily involves an admission of contributory
negligence. Therefore, the court clarified the position taken in Neary
that contributory negligence is "eliminated" from a last clear chance
case.
The court in Doichinoff approved and restated the three elements
of last clear chance laid down in Dahmer, but qualified the second
element by holding that actual discovery could be established by
circumstantial evidence.25 Moreover, this circumstantial evidence could
be predicated on a combination of factors possibly more convincing
than direct evidence. Such factors could include testimony that the
defendant's engineer was looking in the direction of the deceased, or
2148 Mont. 152, 136 P.1059 (1913).
=Id. at 162.
'In McIntyre v. N.P.Ry., 56 Mont. 43, 180 P.971 (1919), the court affirmed the
actual discovery requirement in an inattentive plaintiff case. McIntyre is discussed
in 92 A.L.R. 95 (1934).
151 Mont. 582, 154 P.924 (1916). Discussed in 59 A.L.R. 2d 1265 (1958).
n PROSSER, supra note 4, at 441. PROSSER states that "'[T]he discovery may be
proved by circumstantial evidence, and there is in the decisions so much hair-splitting
as to whether 'ought to have seen' is equivalent to 'saw' that the result of any
particular case is likely to be unpredictable in a given jurisdiction."
[Vol. 30
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NOTES
that the train whistle was blowing. The court gave no intimation that
circumstantial evidence could be determined by an objective standard
such as "should have discovered." Therefore, confusion was avoided
since only "seen" and not "should have seen" could fulfill the actual
discoverey requirement. In Doichinoff, the deceased apparently un-
aware of his perilous position, was an inattentive plaintiff. The defend-
ant's actual discovery was proved by circumstantial evidence. There-
fore, the case was resolved under III. INATTENTIVE PLAINTIFF-ACTUAL
DIsCOVERY By DEFENDANT.2 6
The Montana court modified the actual discovery requirement in
the case of Pollard v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Co." In Pollard, the
plaintiff's truck stalled on the defendant's railroad crossing. The plain-
tiff was kneeling between the dashboard and the seat, oblivious to the
defendant's approaching train. 'Although the engineer had a clear
view of the plaintiff's position on the crossing, the train struck and
injured him. The plaintiff's recovery for personal injuries under last
clear chance was affirmed. The plaintiff, oblivious to the approaching
train, was inattentive. The court found that the defendant's engineer saw
or discovered him. Therefore, the case was resolved under III. INATTEN-
TIVE PLAINTIFF-ACTUAL By DEFENDANT.
The court in Pollard cited the three elements of the Dahmer case
as well as the circumstantial evidence qualification set forth in Doichin-
off. However, the court stated the following exception to the actual
discovery requirement of the Dahmer case: Although actual discovery
is required for trespassers other than at crossings, railroads have a duty
to maintain a lookout at crossings for those in a position of peril; and
liability will be imposed if the plaintiff is injured, whether or not there
is actual discovery. The plaintiff's alternative allegations were held
sufficient to state a claim for relief. The allegations were: "that the
defendant observed and saw or had the defendant exercised ordinary
care would have seen the plaintiff in a position of peril in time to
avoid the injury." The plaintiff in Pollard was inattentive and the court
apparently would have allowed recovery even though the defendant
failed to discover him in a position of peril. Therefore, as applied
2Only two cases were found which dealt specificially with helpless plaintiff situations.
In Westerdale v. N.P.Ry., 84 Mont. 1, 273 P.1051 (1929), the plaintiffs had
negligently driven onto the crossing and were struck by the defendant's train. They
became helpless plaintiffs as the engine dragged them a great distance down the
track. The court held that the duty to avoid the injuries did not arise until -the
engineer knew that the car was struck, and failure thereafter to avoid injury to the
plaintiffs rendered the defendant liable. In Collins v. Crimp, 91 Mont. 326, 8 P.2d
796 (1931), the plaintiff's intestate became helpless on the defendant's fender after
an unavoidable collision. The court held that the defendant's duty arose only when
he actually discovered the intestate in his perilous position on the fender. Recovery
denied because the defendant did not have sufficient time to avoid injuring the
intestate.
192 Mont. 119, 11 P.2d 271 (1932). Discussed in 92 A.L.R. 90, 137 (1934), and
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to railroad crossings, the Pollard case suggests the possibility of recovery
under IV. INATTENTIVE PLAINTIFF-INATTENTIVE DEFENDANT.A s
In the Pollard case, the court disposed of the defense of contributory
negligence by saying:
It is true that this court has recognized that, where an accident
is the result of negligence of the plaintiff concurring with the
primary negligence of the defendant up to and producing the
injury, there is no room for the application of the last clear chance
doctrine . . . but the doctrine presupposes negligence on the part of
the plaintiff and attaches in spite of such negligence when there
a break in the sequence of events. Here, as in the Neary case the
plaintiff remained passive and oblivious of his danger ... and there-
after . . . the engineer discovered his perilous situation in time to
have avoided the accident . . . and 'the defendant's last act of
negligence becomes the sole proximate cause of the injury, while
his initial negligence and the primary negligence of the plaintiff
become the remote causes thereof' ... 29
The court's reference to a "break in the sequence of events" could
only relate to the time element involved. In other words, the plaintiff
was in a position of peril precedent to the defendant's subsequent
failure to avoid the injury after actual discovery. There was no "break
in the sequence of events" insofar as negligence was concerned, because
the plaintiff's inattentiveness had put himself into a position of peril,
and such negligence had operated to the time of the accident. The
court also said that the plaintiff remained "passive" and his primary
negligence was only a "remote" cause of his injury. However, if the
plaintiff had not been stalled, but had inattentively driven onto the.
crossing, there would not have been a break in the sequence of events.
His negligence would then have been active and clearly "concurring,"
thereby leaving "no room for the application of the last clear chance
doctrine," according to the court.
In Pollard, it would seem unreasonable to deny recovery to the plain-
tiff where the defendant actually discovered him inattentively approach-
ing the crossing. On what basis could recovery be justified? The court
stated that the "defendant's last act of negligence" became "the sole
proximate cause." This is an artificial distinction because the plaintiff's
negligence was clearly a proximate cause of his own injury. Therefore,
the defendant's negligence was not the "sole proximate cause" of the
injury. However, the defendant certainly had the last clear opportunity
to avoid the injury. Moreover, the defendant's failure to avoid the
injury would involve a higher degree of fault. Probably, the real
'One year after Pollard, in Linney v. Chicago, M. St. P. & Ry., 94 Mont. 229, 21
P.2d 1101 (1933), the laintiff sought damages to his automobile under the doctrine.
The laintiff did not allege his own negligence, but instead alleged that he had used
every ordinary care and recauption for his safety. The court remanded for a new
trial. In dicta, the court said that the three elements set forth in Dahmer must
concur, except in crossing cases. Furthermore, if the defendant, in the exercise of
ordinary care "ought to have known" that the injured person was in a position of
peril, there need be no actual discovery in order to invoke the rule. Linney is
discussed in 70 A.L.R.2d 52 (1960).
"92 Mont. 119, 11 P.2d 271, at 132.
[Vol. 30
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explanation for recovery under the doctrine would be a dislike for the
defense of contributory negligence. If the plaintiff had been unable to
rely upon the doctrine, his contributory negligence (either inattentively
stalled, or inattentively approaching the crossing) would have barred
any recovery unless he could have established that the defendant's con-
duct approached intent.
The Polled case was expressly affirmed in Armstrong v. Butte, A. &
P. Ry. Co.30 In Armstrong, the plaintiff brought an action of negligence
against the defendant railroad company. The defendant answered by
setting up the plaintiff's contributory negligence as a defense. On the
day of the trial, the plaintiff filed a reply based upon last clear chance
in which he admitted his negligence in carelessly driving his automobile
onto the railroad crossing. The court affirmed the sustaining of a motion
for nonsuit on the ground that the plaintiff could not set up a cause
of action in his reply. In dicta, the court said:
[D]efendant contends that prior cases by this court have held that
before defendant can be held liable under the doctrine of last clear
chance, it must actually have discovered plaintiff in a perilous
position in time to avert the injury, and that it is not sufficient
that in the exercise of proper care it should have discovered him.
3 1
The court refuted the defendant's contention by saying:
It is true that this court has held as defendant contends. Those
cases so holding, however, were in effct overruled in the Pollard case
when applied to a crossing or other places where the defendant had
reasonable grounds to anticipate the presence of persons and negli-
gently failed to keep a lookout and to see that which should have
been seen. We reaffirm the holding in the Pollard case. This puts
Montana in harmony with the progressive and enlightened view
throughout the nation as reiterated in. the Restatement of The Law
of Torts. Section 479 thereof states the prevailing rule throughout
the nation as follows: . . .32
The court, in effect, stated that it would henceforth allow recovery
from a defendant who did not but should have discovered a plaintiff
if the place was one where the defendant should have anticipated his
presence. Therefore, if the "undiscovered" plaintiff were inattentive,
as in Pollard, the case would be resolved under IV. INATTENTIVE PLAIN-
TIFF-INATTENTIvE DEFENDANT. This is clearly the minority view. Yet,
the court stated that Pollard and Armstrong' put Montana under the
majority view in accord with the Restatement. Furthermore, Section
479, the helpless plaintiff section, was cited, under which the majority
of courts allow recovery in both category I. (Actual Discovery), and
category II. (Should Have Discovered). The court did not cite the
inattentive plaintiff section, section 480, which limits recovery to cate-
gory III. (Actual Discovery). Therefore, the most likely conclusion
30110 Mont. 133, 99 P.2d 223 (1940). Discussed in 70 A.L.R.2d 52 (1960).
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is that the cases of Pollard and Armstrong stand for the proposition that
an inattentive plaintiff will be allowed to recover from an inattentive
defendant at railroad crossings or places where the plaintiff's presence
should be anticipated. And, the dicta in Armstrong may be interpreted
to mean that the court would also allow a helpless plaintiff to recover
under categories I. and II.-a
There were no decisions on last clear chance from Armstrong in 1940
until Sorrells v. Ryan in 1955.'1 In Sorrells, the plaintiff sued for
damages for personal injuries sustained when struck by the defendant's
automobile. The plaintiff conceded that he was negligently oblivious
to approaching traffic while crossing midway between the intersections
of a well-lighted street. The plaintiff's two alternative causes of action
were held sufficient within the rulings of Pollard and Arnistrong to
entitle him to relief. The complaint, based upon last clear chance,
alleged negligence in the following alternative: "That defendant saw
plaintiff crossing the street, and that she would have seen him in the
exercise of reasonable care." The court permitted an amendment to the
second cause of action to include an allegation that: "had the defend-
ant kept a proper lookout, she would have discovered from plaintiff's
stooped position and posture that he was unaware of the danger from
the approaching automobile in time to avert the accident."
Speaking of the plaintiff's reliance on the Pollard case the court said:
That case established the rule in this state that the doctrine of last
clear chance has application to a case not only where defendant
actually saw plaintiff in a position of peril in time to avoid the
injury by the exercise of reasonable care but also to a case where
in the exercise of reasonable care he should or could have discovered
plaintiff in his perilous position in time to avoid the injury ... The
rule was reaffirmed in Armstrong v. Butte, A. & P. B~y. Co ... ".5
The defendant contended that the plaintiff was crossing the street
at a place where the defendant had no reason to anticipate his presence,
as required under Polled and Armstrong. However, the court said:
This contention cannot be sustained . . . Ordinary caution must be
observed by drivers and pedestrians both at and between crossings
... The fact that plaintiff was crossing and not at the crossing does
not absolve defendant from the duty to exercise reasonable care to
avoid injuring him .... Defendant should have known, if these alle-
gations be true, that plaintiff would not stop walking.36
In Sorrells, the plaintiff was unaware or oblivious to approaching
"See TOELLE, supra note 16, at 27 in which the conclusion is reached that Montana
cannot be said to be contra to the unconscious last chance doctrine as developed
in Section 479 of the RESTATEMENT Or THE LAW Or TORTS. However, the cases
TOELLE used as support are inattentive, not helpless plaintiff situations. Therefore,
Section 480 would be applicable. Furthermore, Section 480 limits recovery to category
III. Only a small minority of jurisdictions allows recovery under category IV.
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traffic, and was therefore inattentive. The court, relying upon Pollard,
an inattentive plaintiff case, and Armstrong, would allow the inattentive
plaintiff to recover from the defendant who actually "saw" or discovered
him in a position of peril in time to avoid the injury. (category III.)
The court would also allow recovery from the defendant who, "in the
exercise of reasonable care . . . should or could have discovered" the
inattentive plaintiff's perilous position in time to avoid the injury.
(category IV.)
In Sorrells, the court did not restrict the defendant's duty to main-
tain a proper lookout to crossings or other places where the presence of
persons could be anticipated. (Pollard, Armstrong) The duty was ex-
tended to include "jay-walkers" crossing in the middle of the street. The
language indicating that "defendant should have known, if these alle-
gations be true, that plaintiff would not stop walking," appears to
imply actual discovery. Otherwise, if the defendant had failed to dis-
cover the plaintiff, he would not have been aware of the plaintiff's
presence, nor of the fact that he was walking. But actual discovery
of the plaintiff by the defendant is found nowhere in the record of the
case. Therefore, Sorrells represents authority for recovery by an inat-
tentive plaintiff under both categories III. INATTENTIVE PLAINTIFF-
ACTUAL DISCOVERY BY DEFENDENT and IV. INATTENTIVE PLAINTIFF-
INATTENTIVE DEFENDANT.
3 7
There was a dissent in Sorrells v. Ryan which concluded that the
plaintiff's negligence, "continuing without interruption" to the time
of the accident, was not a "remote" but a "proximate cause" of his
own injury thereby barring recovery. The dissent improperly referred
to a helpless plaintiff who "cannot reasonably escape in the exercise of
due care." However, in Sorrells, the inattentive plaintiff's negligehee
did actively, not "passively," continue without interruption to the time
of his injury. Therefore, the plaintiff's negligence was not a "remote,"
but a "proximate cause" of his injury. If the defendent was also inat-
tentive and failed to discover the inattentive plaintiff, neither party
would have had the last clear chance to avoid the accident. The negli-
gence of both parties continued actively to the time of the accident.
Neither negligence could be considered higher in degree of fault. Cer-
tainly, the ruling of the Sorrells case under category IV. INATTENTIVE
PLAINTIFF-INATTENTIVE DEFENDANT cannot be sustained on the basis of
usual last clear chance explanations. It must be supported on some other
ground.
Possibly, category IV. rests upon "precepts of humanity," as in
Missouri. 38 In other words, the defendant, in charge of a more dangerous
instrumentality, should be held to a higher duty of care, especially
"In 18 MONT. L. REv. 231 (1957), BORER concludes that insofar as the court relied
upon the combinde holdings of Pollard and Armstrong, Sorrells has no support.
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in train-automobile and automobile-pedestrian collisions. Or, perhaps
the defendant's financial interests, such as a railroad company, fail to
outweigh the physical or property injuries sustained by a plaintiff,
especially where the defendant's insurance company ultimately sustains
the loss. Whatever reasons are given, such policy considerations fail to
take into account an automobile collision involving two negligently
inattentive drivers under category IV.
In an automobile collision under category IV., either inattentive
driver could file a suit claiming that the other party had the last clear
chance to avoid the accident. The party sued could counterclaim on
the same set of facts. If recovery were allowed, the doctrine of last
clear chance would almost become a doctrine of comparative negligence,
i.e. setting-off the negligence of one party against the other party's
negligence. 39 However, if both parties were found equally at fault,
there could be the somewhat ridiculous possibility that each party
would pay the other's damages. Yet, there would be injustice if only
one party were allowed to recover for damages when both were equally
at fault. Furthermore, if both parties, were denied recovery, although
not equally at fault, such a situation would almost amount to a restate-
ment of the rule that contributory negligence bars recovery. If category
IV. is to be retained, it should only be for policy considerations such
as insurance, especially in train-automobile and automobile-pedestrian
collisions. But it would most likely result in confusion in automobile-
automobile collisions.
Soon after Sorrells, a federal court applied Montana law to an inat-
tentive plaintiff case in Feeley v. N. P. Ry. Co.4 1 Feeley was killed when
his jeep and the defendant's train collided at a railroad crossing. The
court stated that an inattentive plaintiff could recover from a defendant
if all three elements essential to recovery under the Dahmer case con-
curred. Discovery could be established by circumstantial evidence. (Doich-
inoff) Recovery for the wrongful death of Feeley was denied because
the court found nothing in the record indicating that the defendant
"actually discovered," or "should reasonably have discovered the perilous
situation by the demeanor or conduct of Feeley in time to avert the
injury. Although recovery was denied, the court would have allowed
an inattentive plaintiff to recover under category III. (Actual Discovery)
and category IV. (should reasonably have discovered).
In Feeley, the court cited section 480 "as a variation of the last clear
chance doctrine . . . defining a defendant's liability to an inattentive
plaintiff." However, section 480 limits recovery to situations in which
8PRossER, supra note 4, at 446-449. PROSSER traces the development of various
comparative negligence statutes. He concludes that "The tendency in the latest
decisions has been to hold that the apportionment statute takes effect, notwithstanding
the fact that the defendant has the last clear chance." Such statutes have increased
rather than clarified the various problems in this area of negligence.
'-230 F.2d 316 (1956).
[Vol. 30
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the defendant actually discovers the inattentive plaintiff under category
III. The language indicating that the defendant "should reasonably have
discovered," is not a basis for recovery under section 480. The court
had cited Pollard as a case which recognizes recovery under these words.
Therefore, the most likely conclusion is that section 480 was cited as a
basis for recovery under the actual discovery requirement of the Dahmer
case. And, the words, "or should reasonably have discovered," was recog-
nized as a possible basis for recovery under Montana law under category
IV. INATTENTIVE PLAINTIFF-INATTENTIVE DEFENDANT.
The most recent decision on last clear chance in Montana was
Mally v. Asanovich.41 In Mally, the plaintiff, a pedestrian, was struck
and injured by the defendant, a motorist, while crossing a highway
during the evening. The defendant testified she saw the plaintiff was
not paying attention to her approaching car. She also testified she
made a mental judgment that she would not stop, although she could
have had she wanted. The court resolved the case by saying:
Under the facts of this case the plaintiff falls under the rules
applicable under section 480 and the case law of this state which rec-
ognizes the position of an inattentive plaintiff who negligently places
himself in a perilous position ... Sorrells v. Ryan.... Recovery under
this situation is much narrower than that of the helpless plaintiff for
an inattentive plaintiff to recover it must be shown that the defend-
ant knew of the plaintiff's perilous situation, or should have known,
and failed to exercise care to avoid injuring the plaintiff. Clearly
here under the facts before the jury they could reasonably have
found that defendant, some 100 feet away from plaintiff, driving
at about 20 miles per hour, who observed the plaintiff not paying
any attention to her and who failed to either blow the horn or to
stop her vehicle until after the accident, could be found to be the
proximate cause of the accident.4 2
In Mally, the defendant "observed" the inattentive plaintiff "not
paying any attention," failed to avoid the injury. Therefore, the case
was resolved under III. INTTENTIVE PLAINTIFF-ACTUAL DISCOVERY By
DEFENDANT. The court cited section 480, which limits recovery to situa-
tions in which the defendant "knew" of the plaintiff's perilous position.
The court used the words, "or should have known," which are not a
recognized basis for recovery under section 480. However, the court
stated that the position of an inattentive plaintiff is recognized "under
section 480 and the case law of this state," and cited Sorrells v. Ryan.
Since the words, "or should have known," have been recognized as a
basis for recovery under the case law of the State, (pollard, Sorrells),
the court may have been referring to two possible bases for recovery in
Montana, section 480 (category III.) and the case law of the state,
(Category IV.). 43
"149 Mont. 99, 423 P.2d 294 (1967).
"Id., at 104.
"The court in Mally used the words, "the proximate cause of the accident,' in the
last line quoted above. However, the negligence of the defendant was not the only
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Conclusions
During the early development of the doctrine of last clear chance
in Montana, the Supreme Court invariably made no distinction between
helpless and inattentive plaintiff situations. With the exception of the
Neary case, the court restricted recovery to actual discovery situations.
The Pollard case extended recovery to crossings, whether a plaintiff
was discovered or not if he was in a perilous position. The Armstrong
case, in dicta, extended recovery to persons at places where their presence
could reasonably be anticipated.
The Sorrells case allowed an inattentive plaintiff to recover from
an inattentive defendant even though his presence would not necessarily
be anticipated at the situs of the accident. Prior cases had allowed
recovery only where there was a clear duty to maintain a lookout.
(Dahmer, Pollard) The Sorrells case established authority for recovery
by an inattentive "jay-walker" from an inattentive driver under category
IV., and would include Montana with Missouri in the minority view.
The case of Mally v. Asanovich was resolved on the basis of actual
discovery, as found under Section 480 of the Restatement. The court,
however, used language which would have supported recovery under
category IV., and the Sorrells case.
The most probable trend in the law of last clear chance in Montana
will be away from recovery under category IV. The court has repeatedly
attempted to classify itself as being within the majority view, making
no claim that it adheres to the Missouri doctrine. The court will likely
retain its rule as applied to pedestrian-automobile and automobile-train
collisions, possibly taking the view that those in charge of dangerous
instrumentalities should be held to a more stringent legal duty to avoid
injuring the interests of others. However, when presented with a case
involving two negligently inattentive automobile drivers, the court
would probably deny recovery rather than enter into the vast maze of
problems which would result from such a liberal rule.
Hopefully, the court in the future will take an affirmative stand
on whether or not an inattentive plaintiff will be allowed to recover in
all situations from an inattentive defendent. Possibly, the court will
a proximate cause which continued actively to the time of the accident. The proximate
cause explanation does not, properly dispose of the case. Possibly, the negligence
of the defendant, who observed the inattentive plaintiff, involved a higher degree
of fault. But, probably the clearest basis for imposing liability is upon the theory
that the defendant, upon discovering the plaintiff in a perilous position, had the
last chance, and a clear chance to avoid the injury. Therefore, the defense of con-
tributory negligence would not operate to bar the plaintiff's recovery.
Further references to the doctrine of last clear chance are:
65A C.J.S., Negligence Sections 136-139 (1966). Key Number 83.
38 Am.Jur., Negligence Sections 215-225 (1942).
5 Am.Jur., Negligence 779 (1936).
53 Am.Jur., Trial 174 (1945).
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clear up its position of allowing an inattentive plaintiff to recover from
a defendant who "should have discovered the perilous position
under Section 480 and the case law of the state." As it appears, this
language allows recovery under both category III. (Actual Discovery)
and category IV. (Inattentive Defendant. Also, a flat statement that
the defense of contributory negligence is disfavored in a given case,
could help alleviate the problems resulting from the use of terms such
as "passive," "remote," "concurring," and "sole proximate cause." Such
words are limited in scope and could operate to bar recovery in situa-
tions clearly warranting recovery.
As the law stands at present, a helpless plaintiff could expect to
recover, whether actually discovered or not, no matter where the collision
occurs, if the requirements of Section 479 are fulfilled. (dicta in Arm-
strong) An inattentive plaintiff at a railroad crossing could also expect
recovery, whether actually discovered or not. (Pollard) Furthermore,
an inattentive plaintiff, crossing in the middle of the street, could
expect to recover from a defendant, whether actually discovered or not.
(Sorrells) It is presently questionable whether an inattentive driver will
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